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ABSTRACT 
  The statutory debt limit restricts the funds that can be borrowed 
to meet the government’s financial obligations. On the other hand, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause mandates that all the 
government’s financial obligations be met. This Note argues that the 
Public Debt Clause is violated when government actions create 
substantial doubt about the validity of the public debt, a standard that 
encompasses government actions that fall short of defaulting on or 
directly repudiating the public debt. The Note proposes a test to 
determine when substantial doubt is created. This substantial doubt test 
analyzes the political and economic environment at the time of the 
government’s actions and the subjective apprehension exhibited by debt 
holders. Applying this test, this Note concludes that Congress’s actions 
during the 1995–96 and 2011 debt-limit debates violated the Public 
Debt Clause, though Congress’s conduct during the debate over the 
debt limit in 2002 did not. And under a departmentalist understanding 
of executive power, a conclusion of this nature would be the basis for 
the president to ignore the debt limit when congressional actions create 
unconstitutional doubt about the validity of the public debt. 
 
Copyright © 2013 by Jacob D. Charles. 
 † Duke University, J.D. and M.A. expected 2013; Biola University, M.A. 2010; 
University of California, Irvine, B.A. 2007. I would like to thank Professor Joseph Blocher for 
his numerous comments, helpful insights, and consistent encouragement throughout the writing 
process. Professor Lisa Griffin and Brianne Gorod also provided extremely useful feedback. 
Thank you also to my Duke Law Journal editors Emily May and Oscar Shine, and the rest of 
the editorial staff, for their hard work and excellent assistance. Finally, this Note would not have 
been possible without the patience, encouragement, and support of my wife, Angela. 
CHARLES IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2013  12:23 PM 
1228 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1227 
INTRODUCTION 
Less than a year after Standard & Poor’s historic downgrade of 
U.S. debt, Speaker of the House John Boehner declared that 
Republicans would never quietly acquiesce in another increase in the 
statutory debt limit.1 Although the statutory debt limit,2 sometimes 
called the “debt ceiling,” has been increased under every president 
since its codification in 1939,3 there has been a noticeable shift in 
recent decades that has caused debt-limit legislation to meet 
increasingly hostile opposition.4 And there are signs that the 
opposition—and the ensuing debate—are becoming more contentious 
with each legislative proposal.5 Yet one thing is clear: authorizing 
such increases is a fixture of American fiscal policy. Though the 
political landscape surrounding government debt has never been 
completely tranquil, recent debates have been especially combative. 
This Note presents a way to distinguish between constitutionally 
permissible political battles and those that cross the line established 
by the Public Debt Clause, by asking whether government action 
creates substantial doubt about the government’s ability or 
willingness to meet its financial obligations. 
Since the origin of the Republic, Congress has placed limits on 
the federal government’s borrowing authority.6 Before World War I, 
Congress gave the executive borrowing authority only for specific 
 
 1. See Jackie Calmes, As a Debt Battle Looms, Budget Veterans See No Option but To 
Raise Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2012, at A12 (recounting Speaker Boehner’s refusal to accept 
another increase in the debt ceiling without a decrease in spending). 
 2. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing the statutory debt limit), amended 
by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240. 
 3. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 136–39 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/hist.pdf (listing debt-limit legislation). 
 4. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 135, 154–57 (2005) (discussing the vitriol of recent debates). 
 5. See Peter Grier, Is Washington Careening Toward Another Debt Limit Crisis?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 16, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ DC-Decoder/
Decoder-Wire/2012/0516/Is-Washington-careening-toward-another-debt-limit-crisis (explaining 
the polarized debate on debt-limit increases). 
 6. See D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31967, THE 
DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 6 (2012) (“Congress has always placed 
restrictions on federal debt.”); cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 139–40 (“[W]hile Congress 
initially maintained significant control over the conditions under which national debt could be 
incurred, over time it increasingly has delegated even this authority to the Treasury 
Secretary.”). 
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actions through targeted legislation.7 The modern aggregated limit—
which allows the Department of the Treasury (the Treasury) to incur 
debt on whatever terms necessary—traces back to 1939.8 The current 
statute creates an overall ceiling on the aggregate amount of 
government indebtedness.9 
The debt limit has always factored prominently in American 
fiscal policy, often as a source of controversy. From its very inception 
the debt limit required an increase during each year that the United 
States was involved in World War II.10 And though “[c]ongressional-
executive interactions with respect to the debt limit remained, for the 
most part, harmonious”11 in the 1950s, even Republican members of 
Congress were not sanguine about the prospect of increasing the debt 
limit as often as President Eisenhower desired.12 The administrations 
of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson faced strident opposition to debt-
limit increases during what had been, in comparison, fairly routine 
votes under Eisenhower.13 This conflict was partly a function of the 
increasing frequency of debt-limit increases14 and partly a result of 
 
 7. Id. at 5; see also, e.g., Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1302, 32 Stat. 481 (repealed) (authorizing 
the incurrence of debt for construction of the Panama Canal). The first major statutory limit on 
debt was codified in the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, ch. 56, 40 Stat. 288 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. IV 2011)), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240, which placed different restrictions on different types of debt, id. §§ 1, 
5, 40 Stat. at 288, 290–91. 
 8. See H.J. Cooke & M. Katzen, The Public Debt Limit, 9 J. FIN. 298, 300 (1954) 
(“[T]he . . . $45 billion combined limit automatically became the first over-all limitation on the 
size of the public debt with a general application to all principal types of securities; only a 
relatively small amount of minor issues were excluded.”). 
 9. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (Supp. IV 2011), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (“The face amount of obligations issued under this chapter and the 
face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States 
Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the Treasury) may not be 
more than $14,294,000,000,000 outstanding at one time . . . .”). 
 10. See Public Debt Act of 1944, ch. 240, 58 Stat. 272; Public Debt Act of 1943, ch. 52, 57 
Stat. 63; Public Debt Act of 1942, ch. 205, 56 Stat. 189; Public Debt Act of 1941, ch. 7, 55 Stat. 7 
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. IV 2011)), amended by Budget Control Act of 
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240; supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 11. Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 150. 
 12. See Linda K. Kowalcky & Lance T. LeLoup, Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt 
Limitation, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 14, 16–17 (1993) (outlining mounting Republican disapproval 
over the course of several debt-limit votes). 
 13. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 152 (noting that both Democrats and Republicans 
“began using votes on debt limit increase requests as occasions to attack the fiscal policy of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations”). 
 14. See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 8 (“After 1954, the debt limit was reduced twice 
and increased seven times, until March 1962 . . . . Since March 1962, Congress has enacted 76 
separate measures that have altered the limit on federal debt.”). One reason debt-limit 
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disagreement over the ideological presuppositions of Keynesian 
economic theory, which heralded budget deficits as effective 
economic stimuli.15 
In the 1970s, the debt limit began to be used as more than a mere 
ceiling on governmental borrowing authority. Throughout the Ford 
and Carter administrations, the trend of “us[ing] . . . the debt ceiling 
vote as a vehicle for other legislative matters” developed.16 In 
particular, members of the minority party increasingly amended debt-
limit legislation—often with entirely nongermane proposals—to 
ensure that they received something from their acquiescence.17 This 
trend continued into the Reagan administration in the 1980s,18 during 
which the executive-congressional relationship soured even further.19 
And after Reagan-era budget reforms turned out to be ineffective, 
spending under the first President Bush—necessitated by, among 
other things, the Gulf War and the savings-and-loan bailout—
required more frequent increases.20 
Comparatively few debt-limit increases were necessary during 
the next few decades,21 though some of the increases that were 
required triggered intense debate. After four consecutive years of 
budget surpluses in his second term, President Clinton left office 
“grandly proclaim[ing] in 1999 that the entire $5.6 trillion national 
debt could be paid off by 2015.”22 Unfortunately, the external shocks 
during President George W. Bush’s administration23 required that the 
 
increases have become more frequent is that the debt limit is not tied to inflation. Therefore, 
even if no deficits grew the debt for decades, the nominal dollar-denominated debt limit would 
still need to increase to keep pace with inflation. Ezra Klein, Suspending the Debt Ceiling Is a 
Great Idea. Let’s Do It Forever!, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Jan. 22, 2013, 1:52 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/22/suspending-the-debt-ceiling-is-
a-great-idea-lets-do-it-forever/. 
 15. See Kowalcky & LeLoup, supra note 12, at 17–18 (laying out the contours of Keynesian 
theory and its impact on debt-limit debates). 
 16. Id. at 18. 
 17. See id. at 19 (“Proposed amendments were not new to debt limit legislation; the 
difference was in their germaneness to the issue.”). 
 18. Id. at 18. 
 19. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 154 (“The [1980s] also wrought noticeable shifts in 
Congress’s use of the debt limit statute.”). 
 20. ANDREW L. YARROW, FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS: THE INTERGENERATIONAL 
DANGERS OF FISCAL IRRESPONSIBILITY 44 (2008). 
 21. See supra note 3. 
 22. YARROW, supra note 20, at 46. 
 23. See id. at 47 (“[T]he dot.com boom turned into a stock-market collapse; the United 
States was attacked by terrorists, leading to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and a mild recession 
depressed incomes and federal revenues.”). 
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debt limit be increased three times in slightly more than two years.24 
Some of these debates at the outset of President Bush’s first term 
were acrimonious;25 the increases that were passed during his second 
term “took a less dramatic path.”26 In stark contrast, the increases 
under President Obama took the opposite route—uncontroversial at 
first and then involving fierce political struggles as his term wore on.27 
This Note demonstrates the relevance of Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (the Public Debt Clause)28 to congressional 
conduct concerning the statutory debt limit. It argues that Congress 
has acted unconstitutionally during debates over raising the debt limit 
by causing the validity of the public debt to be questioned in violation 
of the Public Debt Clause. Two notable commentators who 
comprehensively examined the scope of the Public Debt Clause did 
not relate its broad commands to congressional inaction in the face of 
an unyielding debt limit.29 Nor has the recent literature created a 
systematic method to determine when the Public Debt Clause is 
violated.30 Filling that void, this Note develops, elaborates, and 
applies a test to decipher the boundaries of the Public Debt Clause—
and concludes that Congress has violated the Public Debt Clause on 
at least two separate occasions.31 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the drafting 
history of the Public Debt Clause. Part II then analyzes its meaning, 
concluding that actions short of direct repudiation or actual default—
 
 24. Act of Nov. 19, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-415, 118 Stat. 2337; Act of May 27, 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-24, 117 Stat. 710; Act of June 28, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-199, 116 Stat. 734 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. IV 2011)), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240. 
 25. See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 14–16 (outlining the difficulty in passing debt-
limit legislation between 2002 and 2006). 
 26. Id. at 16. 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.”). 
 29. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment 
Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561 (1997) (discussing use of the Public Debt Clause to enforce a balanced 
budget); P.J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 1 
(1933) (arguing that the Public Debt Clause should forbid discarding the gold standard). 
 30. Cf. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How To Choose the Least Unconstitutional 
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the 2011 Debt Ceiling Standoff, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1175, 1180–81, 1243 (2012) (assuming that the “realistic options were all 
unconstitutional,” and then arguing that the “least unconstitutional” option was for the 
president to ignore the debt limit). 
 31. See infra Parts III–IV. 
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actions that create substantial doubt—may constitute an 
unconstitutional questioning of the debt. Next, Part III proposes a 
legal standard to govern the Public Debt Clause, the substantial doubt 
test, which focuses on (1) the political and economic context in which 
certain congressional conduct occurs, and (2) the subjective debt-
holder apprehension caused by the government’s actions. Part IV 
then applies the test to several recent debt-limit debates, finding 
congressional actions during the 1995–96 and 2011 debates to be 
unconstitutional. 
Assuming a departmentalist account of executive power, when 
the Public Debt Clause is violated by congressional actions that place 
the debt’s validity in substantial doubt, the president can refuse to 
enforce—that is, refuse “to carry into effect”32—the debt limit and 
order the Treasury Secretary to continue borrowing funds to meet the 
government’s obligations. This authority is not an imperial power, but 
a solemn duty—a requirement that the president refuse to allow 
Congress to violate the Constitution.33 In the end, whether the 
departmentalist description of executive power is correct or not, there 
can be little doubt that at least some congressional actions have 
violated the Public Debt Clause.34 And this should be troubling to all. 
 
 32. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1284–85 (1996) (arguing that the executive is the sole 
branch able “to carry into effect federal statutes”). 
 33. The debate over executive disregard is beyond the scope of this Note, but the argument 
here is that if the president does have the authority to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws, 
then the president could exercise this authority to ignore the debt limit when the limit is applied 
unconstitutionally. Compare, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 905, 909–11, 913–14 (1990) (arguing that the executive branch can—and should—have 
its own constitutional interpretation), and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty 
To Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008) (making textual, structural, and 
historical arguments for the president’s power to disregard unconstitutional laws), with Eugene 
Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 381 (1986) (“In our constitutional 
system of government, such a refusal by the Executive to ‘take care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed’ cannot and must not be tolerated.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)), and 
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal 
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 997–98 (1994) (setting forth strict standards for 
determining when, if ever, a president can refuse to enforce a law). 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
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I. THE DRAFTING AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DEBT 
CLAUSE 
The Fourteenth Amendment has a long, complex, and 
controversial history.35 It is clear, however, that a central goal of the 
amendment was to ensure that if and when Southerners were 
readmitted to the Union and to elected office, they could not undo 
the results of the Civil War.36 This protection was necessary because 
as a consequence of emancipation and the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the South and its interests would receive increased 
representation in Congress, a fact that did not sit well with many loyal 
Unionists.37 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Public Debt 
Clause, proclaims that “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United 
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of 
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned.”38 In the drafting process, the 
Public Debt Clause underwent a noteworthy evolution that has been 
largely unexamined in the secondary literature.39 Most of the floor 
debate about the proposed amendment focused, as one would expect, 
on more pressing matters, such as the contours of equal protection 
and the nature of the citizenship guarantee.40 In fact, early versions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not include a public debt clause at 
all,41 and little was said about the language in Congress when a debt 
clause was introduced.42 The meager discussions that did take place, 
 
 35. See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1–12 (1988). 
 36. Charles E. Chadsey, The Fourteenth Amendment, 1 U. COLO. STUD. 197, 198 (1903) 
(“As the Constitution then stood, there would be nothing to prevent these states [in the South] 
from legally reversing all their actions . . . . Therefore good politics demanded that the 
Constitution be amended so as to prevent the most serious of the dangers which they believed 
threatened them.”). 
 37. See WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
1865–1877, at 53–54 (1907) (“That the result of the war should be an accession of influence in 
Congress to the South, was a proposition which few northerners could contemplate with entire 
equanimity.”). 
 38. To simplify matters, this Note speaks of Section 4 simpliciter referring only to the first 
sentence—the Public Debt Clause. 
 39. Only three legal scholars discuss the Public Debt Clause in any appreciable depth. See 
supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 40. Eder, supra note 29, at 4. 
 41. NELSON, supra note 35, at 49. 
 42. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 582 (“The Public Debt Clause emerged not from a 
congressional debate about the dynamics of the Fiscal Constitution, but from a Thirty-Ninth 
Congress focused on reconstructing a war-ravaged nation. It is not surprising then that no 
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however, are best understood in the context of the Public Debt 
Clause’s evolution.43 Because the evolution of the Public Debt Clause 
is key to understanding its meaning, this Part explores the drafting 
history before turning in Part II to analyze the final text.44 
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was tasked with 
determining the conditions under which the rebel states could be 
readmitted to the Union and whether current representatives from 
these states would be recognized as full members of Congress.45 
Importantly, it also took responsibility for drafting the Fourteenth 
Amendment.46 On April 30, 1866, the proposal adopted by the Joint 
Committee was reported to the full House and Senate.47 In the fourth 
section, it read: 
Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any 
debt or obligation already incurred, or which may hereafter be 
incurred, in aid of insurrection or of war against the United States, 
or any claim for compensation for loss of involuntary service or 
labor.48 
After the House passed this version of Section 4 on May 10, the 
Senate began debate.49 
Then, on May 23, Republican Senator Benjamin Wade offered a 
revision to this section, which read: 
The public debt of the United States, including all debts or 
obligations which have been or may hereafter be incurred in 
suppressing insurrection or in carrying on war in defense of the 
Union, or for payment of bounties or pensions incident to such war 
and provided for by the law, shall be inviolable. But debts or 
obligations which have been or may hereafter be incurred in aid of 
insurrection or of war against the United States, and claims of 
 
member of the House or Senate commented for the record on the Clause’s consequences for 
posterity.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 43. See id. (examining the legislative history). 
 44. This is not, of course, to say that the debates in Congress are more important to the 
meaning of the Public Debt Clause than its text. This Note treats the drafting history first 
merely because it is logically and temporally prior to the final enactment and itself informs the 
analysis of the text. 
 45. See DUNNING, supra note 37, at 51–53. 
 46. Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise—Section One in 
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 934 (1984). 
 47. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 115 (1956). 
 48. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Sen. John Bingham). 
 49. JAMES, supra note 47, at 129–31. 
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compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, shall not be 
assumed or paid by any State nor by the United States.50 
Though this revision took the further and substantial step of 
protecting the Union debt as well as repudiating the Confederate 
debt, it was uncontroversial.51 Although it was ultimately withdrawn 
before it came to a vote,52 the Wade amendment is significant for a 
number of reasons.53 First, it made the initial suggestion that the debt 
of the United States should be protected in the Constitution.54 
Second, its language is so similar to the final version that it sheds light 
on the latter’s meaning.55 Third, it created the most discussion about 
the need for a provision protecting the national debt.56 And finally, 
given Senator Wade’s importance in the 39th Congress, his views 
represented what many congressional Republicans likely believed.57 
When he proposed his amendment to the Public Debt Clause, 
Senator Wade spoke at length about the necessity of protecting the 
Union debt.58 His proposal went, he argued, “to another branch of 
this business almost as essential” as repudiating the Confederate 
debt.59 His revision would “put[] the debt incurred in the civil war on 
our part under the guardianship of the Constitution of the United 
States, so that a Congress cannot repudiate it.”60 Significantly, he 
thought it would “be of incalculable pecuniary benefit to the United 
 
 50. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade). 
 51. See Eder, supra note 29, at 5–6 (discussing widespread agreement on these principles). 
 52. See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 53. See generally Jack M. Balkin, More on the Original Meaning of Section Four of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, BALKINIZATION (July 2, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2011/07/more-on-original-meaning-of-section.html (discussing the importance of Senator 
Wade). 
 54. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768–70 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin 
Wade) (emphasizing the need for constitutional protection of the national debt). 
 55. See id. at 2768, 3040 (statements of Sen. Benjamin Wade and Sen. Daniel Clark) (listing 
both versions of the Public Debt Clause). 
 56. See id. at 2768–70 (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade). 
 57. See Balkin, supra note 53 (“Ben Wade was not just any senator. He was a key 
Republican leader during this period—the leader of the Radical Republicans, in fact—and was 
soon to be elected President pro tempore of the Senate. . . . Thus, when Wade spoke, he was 
speaking as the leader of the Radical faction, and not simply as some nondescript back-
bencher.”). 
 58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768–70 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin 
Wade). 
 59. Id. at 2769 (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade). 
 60. Id. 
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States.”61 For Senator Wade, the reason it would benefit the United 
States was a simple matter of economics: 
I have no doubt that every man who has property in the public funds 
will feel safer when he sees that the national debt is withdrawn from 
the power of a Congress to repudiate it and placed under the 
guardianship of the Constitution than he would feel if it were left at 
loose ends and subject to the varying majorities which may arise in 
Congress.62 
Necessity demanded that the debt be protected by the Constitution 
because, as Senator Wade noted, when the Southerners returned to 
Congress, it would be hard to “guaranty that the debts of the 
Government will be paid, or that your soldiers and the widows of 
your soldiers will not lose their pensions.”63 Unfortunately, there is no 
recorded explanation for why Senator Wade’s language was altered in 
the next, and penultimate, draft.64 
Nonetheless, Senator Wade’s comments illustrate the very vivid 
fear among congressional Republicans that Southern Democrats 
would return to Congress and repudiate the Union debt.65 Indeed, 
there had been cries in the South to do just that.66 For instance, on 
September 22, 1865—less than a year before ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—the Liberator printed a speech by Senator 
Charles Sumner recounting the ominous words of an unnamed 
Virginian Democratic congressional candidate: “I am opposed to the 
Southern States being taxed for the redemption of this [Union] debt, 
either directly or indirectly.”67 Not only was the quoted candidate 
ideologically opposed to the idea, but he also vowed to act on his 
opposition: “[I]f elected to Congress, I will oppose all such measures, 
and I will vote to repeal all laws that have heretofore been passed for 
that purpose; and, in doing so, I do not consider that I violate any 
obligation to which the South was a party.”68 The candidate concluded 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Eder, supra note 29, at 5–6 (indicating the limited discussion about the replacement 
of the Wade amendment). 
 65. Senator Charles Sumner, Speech at the Republican State Convention, reprinted in The 
National Security and the National Faith: Guarantees Needed for the National Freedman and the 
National Creditor, LIBERATOR, Sep. 22, 1865, at 35. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting the unnamed candidate). 
 68. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting the unnamed candidate). 
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that as far as he was concerned, the South “never plighted [its] faith 
for the redemption of the war debt.”69 It is unsurprising, then, that 
Senate Republicans never questioned Senator Wade’s proposal.70 
Protecting the Union debt was the logical counterpart to the 
unquestioned repudiation of the Confederate debt.71 
Senator Wade withdrew his proposed revision72 after an 
alternative version was agreed to in the Senate Republican Caucus 
and introduced on May 29.73 The new version read as follows:74 
[Section 4:] The obligations of the United States incurred in 
suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or for payment 
of bounties or pensions incident thereto, shall remain inviolate. 
[Section 5:] Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection [or] 
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for compensation 
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations, and claims shall be forever held illegal and void.75 
There was little discussion about this replacement to the Wade 
amendment because it was largely accomplished during a closed-door 
Republican Senate caucus.76 Some Democrats, however, did question 
this section. “Who,” asked Senator Thomas Hendricks, “has asked us 
to change the Constitution for the benefit of the bond-holders?”77 
Rather than secure the national debt, Senator Hendricks feared that 
“[a] provision like this . . . would excite distrust, and cast a shade on 
 
 69. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting the unnamed candidate). 
 70. Eder, supra note 29, at 5–6. 
 71. Indeed, even President Andrew Johnson urged the Southern states to repudiate their 
own war debt. See, e.g., Andrew Johnson, The Rebel War Debts: Important Dispatch from 
President Johnson, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1865, at 1 (reporting President Johnson’s demand to 
North Carolina’s provisional governor that “[e]very dollar of the State debt created to aid the 
rebellion against the United States should be repudiated, finally and forever”). 
 72. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2869 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade). 
 73. JAMES, supra note 47, at 140–42. 
 74. The original proposal was to split the section and call the first sentence Section 4 and 
the second sentence Section 5. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2869 (1866) (statement 
of Sen. Jacob Howard). 
 75. See id. at 2869, 2941 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). This language was 
reconstructed from the Congressional Globe’s record of revisions suggested by Senator Howard, 
who made a series of proposals to modify the text, such as “strike out the word ‘already,’ in line 
thirty-four.” Later, “any claim for compensation for” was changed to “any claim on account of.” 
Id. at 2941 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. JAMES, supra note 47, at 140–41 (discussing the caucus’s work). 
 77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2938, 2940 (1866) (statement of Sen. Thomas 
Hendricks). 
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public credit.”78 Recall, however, that the May 29 version only 
guaranteed “[t]he obligations of the United States incurred in 
suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or for payment 
of bounties or pensions incident thereto.”79 This version of Section 4 
was not a blanket protection of national debt but a limited protection 
of Civil War debt only. 
On June 4, Republican Senator William Fessenden worried that 
“[t]here is a little obscurity, or, at any rate, the expression in section 
four might be construed to go further than was intended, and I have 
rather come to the conclusion that it was best to put sections four and 
five in one single section.”80 But he gave no further elaboration about 
the defects of the fourth section as it then stood.81 In fact, the final 
revision of the clause that came to be the Public Debt Clause 
broadened the language of the previous proposal; it did not 
circumscribe it.82 Though originally intent on offering an amendment 
to cure the defects that he perceived, Senator Fessenden did not offer 
one,83 and it is unclear what exact revision he desired. There is no 
surviving record of his unoffered amendment, and no further 
discussion on the matter ensued until the day of the final Senate 
vote.84 
Finally, on June 8, perhaps following Senator Fessenden’s 
criticism of the obscurity of the two debt sections, Senator Daniel 
Clark offered an amendment combining Sections 4 and 5 into the 
final version of the current Section 4.85 Significantly, however, when 
questioned about whether his revision “changes at all the effect of the 
fourth and fifth sections,”86 Senator Clark stated that “[t]he result is 
 
 78. Id. at 2940 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hendricks). 
 79. Id. at 2869 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). 
 80. Id. at 2941 (statement of Sen. William Fessenden). 
 81. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1866) (demonstrating that Senator 
Fessenden chose to withhold his amendment at that time and did not suggest any further 
changes to Section 4). 
 82. For a comparison of the final text of the Public Debt Clause and the text of the 
previous proposal, see supra notes 28, 75 and accompanying text. 
 83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1866) (statement of Sen. William 
Fessenden). 
 84. See id. (“I will omit offering my amendment . . . until the resolution is reported to the 
Senate.”). 
 85. Id. at 2869 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); id. at 2941, 3040, 3042 (statement of Sen. 
William Fessenden). 
 86. Id. at 3040 (statement of Sen. Reverdy Johnson). 
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the same” as that of the May 29 Caucus proposal.87 The revision was 
then approved without another recorded word,88 and the House 
concurred in the Senate’s revisions to the amendment.89 
Despite Senator Clark’s comments, there are significant 
differences between the final three versions. Senator Wade’s May 23 
proposal, like the final version, protected the national debt broadly 
and said that it “shall be inviolable.”90 The subsequent version (the 
May 29 Caucus proposal), guaranteed only the debt that had been 
“incurred in suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or 
for payment of bounties or pensions incident thereto,”91 and it 
declared that only this debt “shall remain inviolate.”92 The final, 
adopted version harkened back to Senator Wade’s proposal by 
protecting the national debt broadly, but instead the revised text said 
that the public debt “shall not be questioned.”93 It is curious, then, 
that Senator Clark could maintain that the final version changed 
nothing from the penultimate version.94 
Whatever may be made of Senator Clark’s comment, the final 
version of the Public Debt Clause had more in common with the 
Wade proposal than with its immediate predecessor because it 
encompassed the general national debt within its purview. In less than 
six weeks, the Public Debt Clause went from simply repudiating the 
debt of the Southern States to protecting the debt of the United 
 
 87. Id. at 2869, 3040 (statement of Sen. Daniel Clark). 
 88. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040 (1866). 
 89. Id. at 3148–49. 
 90. See id. at 2768 (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade) (containing the text of the 
amendment, which protects “[t]he public debt of the United States”). 
 91. Id. at 2869 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2768, 3040 (1866) (statements of Sen. Benjamin Wade and Sen. James Doolittle) 
(demonstrating that both versions of the amendment protected “the public debt of the United 
States”). 
 94. Id. at 3040 (statement of Sen. Daniel Clark). For attempts to explain these comments, 
see, for example, Eder, supra note 29, at 8, which suggests that Senator Clark’s comment was “a 
mere passing remark, not fully weighed, and of little consequence as a guide to interpretation.” 
In addition, Professor Michael Abramowicz gives three reasons to disregard Senator Clark’s 
comment: (1) “stylistic changes in constitutional provisions are not generally assumed to be 
without substantive content,” so the change likely mattered; (2) the comment “may merely 
indicate that the [two] versions would have the same result for the purposes of Reconstruction”; 
and (3) “the Senate [later] rejected a subsequent proposal to revert” back to the previous 
language, so it seems logical to conclude that there was something about the change that the 
Senate preferred. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 584–85. 
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States as a whole.95 Though important and consequential, these 
changes were little discussed.96 There was near-unanimous agreement 
on the original language presented to the House by the Joint 
Committee.97 
Though the legislative history can help illuminate the scope of 
the Public Debt Clause, this history is only one step in determining 
the extent of its application. Nevertheless, the legislative history 
suggests that the Public Debt Clause was meant to encompass the 
public debt of the United States generally, not only the debt incurred 
in the Civil War, and was, at least in part, designed to put the public 
debt above the vagaries of partisan politics. 
II. THE MEANING OF THE PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE: DETERMINING 
THE NATURE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT 
Recall that the final text of the Public Debt Clause, adopted by 
both chambers of Congress and ratified by the states,98 reads: “The 
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned.”99 Though hardly any of these terms are unambiguous, a 
general understanding of the Framers and their audience helps 
inform the debate about the Public Debt Clause’s continuing 
relevance.100 Thus, in addition to the drafting history, this Note draws 
on the public meaning of the clause at the time of enactment and 
ratification.101 Together with insights from modern commentators, the 
original public meaning sheds new light on the continued vitality of 
the Public Debt Clause. In particular, the text and historic 
understanding suggest that actions by the government that create 
 
 95. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (statement of Sen. John Bingham) (1866); 
id. at 3148 (statement of Sen. Thaddeus Stevens) (listing the first and last versions of the 
section). 
 96. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 97. See Eder, supra note 29, at 4–5 (“To this principle there was no opposition.”). 
 98. The Fourteenth Amendment was declared to be ratified on July 21, 1868. Id. at 12. 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
 100. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1130–31 (2003) (advocating for the use 
of originalism in interpreting the Constitution). 
 101. This approach suggests that constitutional inquiry involves “faithful application of the 
words and phrases of the text in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the time 
they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted the text as 
law.” Id. at 1131. 
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substantial doubt about the validity of the public debt—actions short 
of direct repudiation or outright default—are unconstitutional. 
A. Problems with Stopping at Repudiation or Default 
The central uncertainty with the Public Debt Clause is defining 
the nature of conduct that constitutes an impermissible questioning of 
the public debt.102 At least three different levels of action could be 
prohibited by the Public Debt Clause’s proscription of questioning: 
(1) repudiation, (2) default, or (3) some actions short of default. If 
level (1) accurately describes the Public Debt Clause’s prohibition, 
then the only conduct that would trigger the Public Debt Clause is an 
outright official declaration of repudiation. Stated another way, only 
repudiating the debt would violate the demand that “the public 
debt . . . shall not be questioned.” On the other hand, if default—
level (2)—is what the Public Debt Clause prohibits, then repudiation 
would still be unconstitutional because it is a more drastic disregard 
of financial obligations than default,103 but so would the step prior to 
repudiation—a missed government payment on its debt (that is, 
default). Finally, if the correct reading of the Public Debt Clause 
encompasses some lesser conduct—level (3)—then both repudiation 
and default are also prohibited, but some government action that 
precedes both default and repudiation would also be unconstitutional. 
This lower level of government action includes conduct that creates 
pervasive lack of confidence in the government’s ability to meet its 
obligations by generating widespread doubt about the validity of the 
public debt. 
This Note argues that both default and repudiation are 
inappropriate stopping points and that something lesser, something 
within level (3), accurately describes the scope of the Public Debt 
Clause’s prohibition. This Part argues that reading the Public Debt 
Clause to prohibit actions that create substantial doubt about the 
public debt’s validity—a level higher than reasonable doubt, simple 
doubt, or mere decreased confidence—best serves the language, 
history, and purposes of the Public Debt Clause and strikes the 
 
 102. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 589–90 (discussing the importance of this inquiry); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United 
States . . . shall not be questioned.”). 
 103. See Shelagh A. Heffernan, Country Risk Analysis: The Demand and Supply of 
Sovereign Loans, 4 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 389, 405–06 (1985) (recognizing that the costs of 
repudiation are drastic). 
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proper balance between debtholder protection and the necessary 
political latitude for congressional policymaking.104 Several 
considerations support a reading of “questioned” that equates it with 
actions that induce substantial doubt. 
First, the logic of the Public Debt Clause supports a broader 
reading than repudiation—level (1). Interpreting the Public Debt 
Clause to only prohibit repudiation would disregard its broad 
language. Repudiation cannot cause any kind of questioning. If 
Congress repudiates the public debt, there is no validity left to 
question; there is nothing to doubt, for “[r]epudiation is a sovereign 
government declaration that its debt is invalid.”105 In other words, if 
repudiation was all that the original Congress was concerned with, 
then a word like “questioned,” with graded shades of meaning, was 
surely ill chosen. It would be a straightforward inquiry in every case 
to discover if the debt is valid: simply ask whether Congress had 
repudiated it. The Public Debt Clause could have encompassed this 
idea more simply by stating that “the public debt is now and shall 
forever be valid.” But the validity of the debt is not questioned when 
the debt is repudiated, the validity of the debt is voided.106 
Moreover, in speaking about the purpose of including a debt 
clause at all, Senator Wade declared his conviction “that every man 
who has property in the public funds will feel safer when he sees that 
the national debt is withdrawn from the power of a Congress to 
repudiate it and placed under the guardianship of the Constitution.”107 
Though speaking expressly of repudiation, the reasoning behind 
Senator Wade’s comment applies equally to conduct short of 
repudiation—one who has invested in public funds would likely be 
just as dismayed to find that Congress will only occasionally pay him 
interest on time. The “guardianship of the Constitution” enables the 
debt holder to feel more secure “than he would feel if [the national 
debt] were left at loose ends and subject to the varying majorities 
 
 104. If an even lower level more adequately and accurately represents the Public Debt 
Clause, it only buttresses the central argument of this Note. This Note’s argument only depends 
on a rejection of either repudiation or default as a point at which to stop the analysis. 
 105. BENJAMIN J. COHEN & FABIO BASAGNI, BANKS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: 
PRIVATE LENDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 104 (1981) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Henry Simon Bloch, Foreign Risk Judgment for Commercial Banks, 160 
BANKERS MAG. 90, 93 (1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 106. Id. 
 107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade). 
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which may arise in Congress.”108 The “varying majorities” in Congress 
held enormous sway over the validity of the public debt prior to the 
Civil War,109 and the Public Debt Clause was meant to dramatically 
reduce this power.110 The prohibition on questioning the validity of 
the debt should, then, extend to actions short of repudiation. 
The case of default presents a more difficult question. For any 
Treasury security, “[d]efault . . . occurs when payment on that bond is 
missed.”111 As with repudiation, the inquiry for default is a simple 
process: check to see whether the government has missed any 
payments on its debt. Although the simplicity of this inquiry weighs 
against equating questioning with default (as it did for equating 
questioning with repudiation), default might nonetheless cause the 
requisite questioning of future debt payments. So, although default is 
quite likely impermissible under the Public Debt Clause, the issue is 
whether any conduct short of default can cause the relevant type of 
questioning. Default only occurs when the government has missed 
payment on one of its legal obligations.112 A debtholder might surely 
question the payment of the government’s subsequent legal 
obligations once a payment is missed. But a host of government 
actions short of default might cause a widespread and pervasive lack 
of trust in the ability (or willingness) of the government to fulfill its 
obligations.113 There are multiple indications that the Public Debt 
Clause was meant to prohibit these lower-level actions as well. 
B. Reasons for Drawing the Line at the Level of Substantial Doubt 
1. Textual Reasons To Prefer Substantial Doubt.  At the time of 
the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, “to 
question” meant “to doubt; to be uncertain of; to have no confidence 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 139 (“Congress initially maintained significant 
control over the conditions under which national debt could be incurred . . . .”). 
 110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade). 
 111. PHILIPPE JORION, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGER HANDBOOK 452 (5th ed. 2009); see also 
Neil H. Buchanan, Some Further Thoughts About the Debt Limit, DORF ON LAW (July 15, 
2011), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/some-further-thoughts-about-debt-limit.html (“Not 
making legally required payments is, under both common sense and the law, defaulting.”). 
 112. JORION, supra note 111, at 452. 
 113. For instance, rhetoric about the refusal to raise the debt limit could very well engender 
fears that the government may not continue to meet its obligations. E.g., Simon Johnson, The 
Debt Ceiling and Playing with Fire, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013, 5:00 A.M.), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/the-debt-ceiling-and-playing-with-fire. 
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in; to mention as not to be trusted.”114 To question meant that one 
could “doubt, . . . controvert, [or] dispute”115 the validity of the debt. 
To have a question about the debt was to quite simply have a “doubt” 
about it.116 Moreover, something with “validity” was said to have 
“legal force”117 or the “force to convince; certainty; value.”118 By 
preserving the validity of the debt, the Public Debt Clause protects 
the debt from actions that would cause the debt to lose “value”119 or 
would cause debt holders to lose “certainty”120 in the obligations of 
the United States. The Public Debt Clause does not simply protect 
the actual debt (from, for example, default or repudiation), but, by 
protecting the debt’s “validity,”121 it guards against certain 
diminutions in the public debt’s value122 or reductions in the certainty 
of its repayment123 as well. These textual indicia support the argument 
that, by using the word “questioned,” Congress meant to do more 
than just guard against default or repudiation. 
2. Historical Reasons To Prefer Substantial Doubt.  There are 
also historical and contextual reasons to think that the Public Debt 
Clause forbids not just repudiation or default, but also the kind of 
actions that would cause debt holders to have substantial doubt about 
the validity of the debt. In his 1901 Constitutional History of the 
United States,124 Professor Francis Newton Thorpe notes the breadth 
with which the Public Debt Clause was interpreted during the 
ratification process: 
The national debt . . . was held chiefly at the North, and its 
repudiation, or diminution in value, or any distrust of its obligation, 
 
 114. SAMUEL JOHNSON & JOHN WALKER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
587 (1827). 
 115. SAMUEL FALLOWS, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS AND ANTONYMS 212 
(1898). 
 116. See NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 348 (1831) 
(defining “Quest’-ion” as “act of asking, interrogatory, inquiry, dispute, doubt”). 
 117. Id. at 488. 
 118. JOHNSON & WALKER, supra note 114, at 764. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United 
States . . , shall not be questioned.”). 
 122. See, e.g., 3 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 297 (1901) (recounting widespread views about the sanctity of the debt). 
 123. JOHNSON & WALKER, supra note 114, at 764. 
 124. THORPE, supra note 122. 
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would affect most disastrously the lives and fortunes of the Northern 
people and would injure our national credit abroad. Its validity was 
essential to our prosperity, however great the burden of payment 
might prove to be.125 
Professor Thorpe reports that “validity”—the aspect of the debt 
that “shall not be questioned”—was equated with “diminution of 
value” or “any distrust” of the government’s obligations. This kind of 
diminution and distrust could occur prior to, and apart from, default 
or repudiation.126 Indeed, Professor Thorpe expressly declares that 
more than mere repudiation was contemplated by the drafters of the 
Public Debt Clause.127 Diminution and distrust would be triggered by 
government conduct that caused debt holders “to doubt” or “to be 
uncertain of” the validity of the debt.128 
This sentiment was widely held at the time.129 The 1866 National 
Union Convention in Pennsylvania adopted a resolution declaring 
that the convention “h[e]ld the debt of the nation to be sacred and 
inviolable; and . . . proclaim[ed] [its] purpose in discharging this, as in 
performing all other national obligations, to maintain unimpaired and 
unimpeached the honor and the faith of the Republic.”130 It was so 
important to protect the debt at this time that simply proscribing 
default or repudiation would not go far enough. In 1933, Professor 
P.J. Eder argued that the Public Debt Clause was designed “to lay 
down a constitutional canon for all time in order to protect and 
maintain the national honor and to strengthen the national credit” 
and was “clearly proposed also to establish a perpetual dike against 
momentary waves of inflation and repudiation, total or partial.”131 The 
 
 125. Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
 126. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 175 (“[T]he debt limit has been criticized for 
creating situations that threaten the credit and financial standing of the United States 
government. . . . The threat of default, even absent actual default, is said to cause market 
uncertainty regarding the United States’ ability to honor its financial obligations and 
accordingly to cost (or threaten to cost) the nation in elevated premiums and yield rates.”). 
 127. THORPE, supra note 122, at 297 (stating that “repudiation or diminution in value, or 
any distrust of its obligation” would be detrimental to the Union (emphasis added)). 
 128. See JOHNSON & WALKER, supra note 114, at 587 (defining “to question” as, inter alia, 
“to doubt; to be uncertain of”). 
 129. Eder, supra note 29, at 10. 
 130. Id. (quoting the Resolution of the Philadelphia Fourteenth of August Convention) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 131. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
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Public Debt Clause, in sum, was meant to be a bulwark against the 
vacillation of the political branches.132 
3. Precedential Reasons To Prefer Substantial Doubt.  In its only 
analysis of the Public Debt Clause, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
breadth of the sweeping language. In Perry v. United States,133 the 
Court recognized that the Public Debt Clause provides robust 
protection for the government’s obligations, stating that “[w]hile this 
provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond 
question the obligations of the Government issued during the Civil 
War, its language indicates a broader connotation.”134 This broader 
connotation was for the Court “confirmatory of a fundamental 
principle”135 that applied to all government bonds—including those 
issued before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. 
Strikingly, the Court hinted that the Public Debt Clause may stretch 
even beyond formal Treasury securities: “Nor can we perceive any 
reason for not considering the expression ‘the validity of the public 
debt’ as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the public 
obligations.”136 
The Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements about the 
“fundamental principle”137 enshrined in the Public Debt Clause and its 
application to “whatever concerns the integrity of the public 
obligations”138 suggest that the Public Debt Clause should be read to 
prohibit some conduct that falls short of outright repudiation or 
actual default. Indeed, it should be read to proscribe action that puts 
the validity of the debt into substantial doubt. Some doubt—some 
loss of confidence—may be impossible to eradicate. But when the 
government’s actions create substantial doubt, these actions cause an 
unconstitutional questioning of the validity of the national debt.139 
 
 132. See Jack M. Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/
legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html (discussing the purpose of the Public Debt Clause). 
 133. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 134. Id. at 354. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (second emphasis added). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 592 (“[T]he literal interpretation of the Clause is 
that a governmental action making uncertain whether or not a debt will be honored is 
unconstitutional.”); Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 30, at 1191–93 (stressing that the Public Debt 
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III. VIOLATIONS OF THE PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE: DEVELOPING THE 
SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT TEST 
The Public Debt Clause, then, should be interpreted broadly to 
protect not just debt incurred during the Civil War, but all 
government debt obligations. Nor should the Public Debt Clause be 
read to simply preserve the public debt from repudiation or default 
alone. Properly read, it protects all legally authorized government 
obligations from actions that create substantial doubt about their 
validity. But recognizing that the Public Debt Clause prohibits actions 
that create substantial doubt is of limited value without a means to 
assess whether substantial doubt in fact exists. 
To undertake the constitutional analysis, this Part creates a 
test—the substantial doubt test—to measure whether government 
actions have created substantial doubt about the validity of the public 
debt. Like the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test under the 
Fourth Amendment140 and the “evolving standards of decency” 
component to Eighth Amendment review,141 the substantial doubt test 
is a means internal to the textual provision to decipher the boundaries 
of the constitutional command. It is not analogous to tests like strict 
scrutiny or rational basis review, which apply in multiple 
constitutional settings, but instead emphasizes the unique nature of 
the specific guarantee under review. The test builds on the 
interpretive conclusions in Part II. 
A. Framework for the Substantial Doubt Test 
The substantial doubt test is an attempt to implement the Public 
Debt Clause’s prohibition on government actions that create 
substantial doubt by focusing on two factors: (1) economic and 
political indicators of macro-level instability, and (2) subjective 
debtholder apprehension. The test is a tool to determine the point at 
which otherwise-permissible government action becomes 
unconstitutional. But it differs from traditional standards of review in 
 
Clause should be read neither too narrowly, so as to eviscerate it, nor too broadly, so as to 
forbid all irresponsible congressional actions). 
 140. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have . . . said 
that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring))). 
 141. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“The Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”). 
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a number of important respects. In particular, the Public Debt Clause 
does not protect a fundamental right as conceptualized by the 
Supreme Court142 and is therefore not amenable to the kind of review 
characterized by, for instance, the strict scrutiny test.143 Furthermore, 
because no individual right is implicated,144 the kind of balancing that 
is characteristic of intermediate scrutiny,145 rational basis review,146 or 
the undue burden test147 is unhelpful. 
Instead, this Note emphasizes the utility of the substantial doubt 
test not as a judicially imposed legal test—though it may have some 
merit in that context as well—but as a standard by which other 
constitutional decisionmakers, and the president in particular, can 
 
 142. The standard for recognizing these rights is high. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (stating that “fundamental rights” are rights that are “‘deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that 
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed’” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320, 325 (1937))); see also Does v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“[I]dentifying a new fundamental right . . . is often an ‘uphill battle’ as the list of 
fundamental rights ‘is short.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 
401 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2005); and Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000))). It 
would be hard to argue, for instance, that having constitutional protection for your investments 
is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko, 
302 U.S. at 325) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (declining to apply the strict scrutiny test to rights not 
deemed fundamental). 
 144. The Public Debt Clause protects the rights of a class of people—holders of U.S. debt—
in ways fundamentally different from other constitutional provisions. The right is a collective 
right, much like the Second Amendment right was considered to be before the Supreme Court 
declared otherwise in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008); see also David 
Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 588, 613 (2000) (“The essence of modern Second Amendment doctrine is that the 
Amendment prohibits only statutes which interfere with the ‘preservation or efficiency’ of the 
states’ militia. Some courts, in applying this doctrine, have referred to the Amendment as 
creating a ‘collective right’; one court has even referred to the Second Amendment right as 
being ‘held by the States.’” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 
178 (1939); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); and Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 
98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996))). 
 145. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a 
statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”). 
 146. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and 
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes 
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is 
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification.”). 
 147. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“A finding of an 
undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect 
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of [someone exercising a constitutional right].”). 
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determine the constitutionality of government action.148 It is therefore 
immaterial for the purposes of this Note that no individual would 
likely have standing to sue for a violation of the Public Debt Clause149 
and that, furthermore, no private right of action would likely be 
 
 148. It is beyond the scope of this Note to outline the process by which the president or 
other executive branch officials should determine whether the substantial doubt test is satisfied 
in any given instance, and then, if they determine that it is, what to do about it. See supra notes 
32–33 and accompanying text. For an excellent treatment of this kind of question, see generally 
Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199 
(1994). 
 149. For standing purposes, an individual must show that she has suffered an injury that has 
been caused by the party whom she is suing and that a ruling in her favor would remedy the 
injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). All three elements—injury, 
causation, and remedy—appear to be problematic for a Public Debt Clause litigant. First, she 
would need to prove the existence of a legally cognizable injury that is “not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’” Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). Here, she 
could find it hard to prove that the value of her investment in public funds had actually 
decreased in an appreciable way in the absence of a default or repudiation. Second, the causal 
nexus between any specifiable government action and the loss to an individual plaintiff is likely 
to be insubstantial at best. A dynamic and reinforcing sequence of action and inaction would 
likely be responsible for the creation of substantial doubt, and it would be difficult to trace the 
causal link. Finally, a writ of mandamus ordering the Treasury Secretary to raise the debt ceiling 
is likely the only remedy that could effectively alleviate the complained-of harm. The judiciary 
is unlikely to use this remedy, if they would have the power to do so at all. See Cheney v. U.S. 
Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (referring to the writ of mandamus as “a ‘drastic and 
extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes’” and stating that “the writ is 
one of ‘the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal’” (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 
259–60 (1947); and Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967))). 
 The more pressing justiciability issue is not standing but the political question doctrine. 
This doctrine is an especially potent restriction on the judiciary when important separation-of-
powers concerns are involved. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“[I]n the Guaranty 
Clause cases and in the other ‘political question’ cases, it is the relationship between the 
judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal 
judiciary’s relationship to the States, which gives rise to the ‘political question.’”). Baker listed 
several conditions under which a political question may be found: when there is 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Id. at 217. The ability to raise the debt limit is entrusted to Congress by the Constitution—both 
in giving Congress sole legislative authority and in giving it the power of the purse, see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8; the decision to raise the debt limit involves a policy choice; and a mandamus 
from the Court would likely indicate disrespect for the coordinate branches. These are but three 
examples of reasons that the Public Debt Clause probably involves a nonjusticiable political 
question. 
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implied.150 Nor is it problematic that by the very nature of the 
prohibition the Public Debt Clause might be declared nonjusticiable, 
much like most claims arising under the Guaranty Clause.151 
The substantial doubt test is original, but is not fashioned from 
whole cloth. Rather, as Part II argues, the Public Debt Clause 
protects debt holders from precisely the kind of government actions 
that create substantial doubt about the debt’s validity. The 
implementation of the substantial doubt test thus follows directly 
from the interpretation of the Public Debt Clause. And the two 
components of the test are inextricably linked to the meaning of the 
textual provisions. The test simply measures whether actions of the 
federal government have made the validity of the debt sufficiently 
uncertain to debt holders. If so, these actions are unconstitutional. 
As psychologists and other researchers use the term, “[d]oubt—
the opposite of confidence— . . . is usually . . . understood to refer to 
internal feelings of high uncertainty.”152 Doubt has been aptly 
described as a kind of “emotional incoherence” in which an 
emotional reaction is provoked by the lack of coherence between 
some proposition and the rest of one’s beliefs.153 Thus, one would 
doubt the proposition “the government is never going to miss a 
payment on its debt” when that proposition is inconsistent with 
background beliefs about the functioning of the economy, the nature 
of political discourse, and other similar factors. Accordingly, “[a]n 
increase in doubt increases consumers’ perceived risk” surrounding 
the value of investments.154 Because doubt refers to “internal feelings 
 
 150. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (noting that in recent decades 
the Court has “consistently refused to extend [liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),] to any new context or new category of 
defendants”). Successful actions for damages for constitutional rights violations, when those 
causes of action have not already been established, are therefore highly unlikely. A Public Debt 
Clause litigant would thus have trouble receiving a financial remedy. 
 151. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) (“[S]ome questions raised under the 
Guaranty Clause are nonjusticiable, where ‘political’ in nature and where there is a clear 
absence of judicially manageable standards.” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 209)). 
 152. Caroline J. Wesson & Briony D. Pulford, Verbal Expressions of Confidence and Doubt, 
105 PSYCHOL. REP. 151, 152 (2009). 
 153. Paul Thagard, What Is Doubt and When Is It Reasonable?, 30 CAN. J. PHIL. 391, 393–94 
(2004) (describing doubt as “emotional incoherence” as “people encounter[ing] a proposition or 
set of propositions that d[oes] not fit with what they already believe[], and . . . react[ing] 
emotionally as well as cognitively”). 
 154. Andrew B. Abel, An Exploration of the Effects of Pessimism and Doubt on Asset 
Returns, 26 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1075, 1082 (2002). 
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of high uncertainty,”155 it is an appropriate barometer to use. After all, 
the Public Debt Clause was designed to protect recipients of the 
government’s obligations from precisely this uncertainty.156 Because 
the Public Debt Clause prohibits conduct that falls short of 
repudiation or default, calculating the substantiality of the doubt 
caused to debt holders is the best way to determine the 
constitutionality of government action. 
B. Factors in the Substantial Doubt Test 
There are two critical indicia bearing on the question of 
substantial doubt: (1) indications of the strength of the national 
economy and the health of the political environment, and 
(2) indications of apprehension felt by debt holders. The first 
component is objective, focusing on data and statistics. The second is 
subjective, emphasizing the “internal feelings”157 that debt holders 
experience vis-à-vis the validity of the debt. These two factors are 
consistent with the central purpose of the Public Debt Clause. The 
possibility of the debt’s validity being questioned only materializes 
under certain economic and political circumstances.158 In a period of 
strong economic performance, a debtor nation has little reason to 
default, and therefore there is little reason to think that anyone would 
question the validity of the debt. It is when countries face difficult 
economic times or unworkable political machinery that debt holders 
fear not receiving timely payment. 
The first component of this analysis looks to the economic and 
political factors surrounding government action. Only when the 
economic or political outlook is sufficiently negative is there a 
plausible threat to the validity of the debt.159 Economic and political 
research into sovereign debt explains several signals for default. 
Though concerning conditions for default, this research is useful 
because the substantial doubt with which the Public Debt Clause is 
 
 155. Wesson & Pulford, supra note 152, at 152. 
 156. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768–70 (1866) (statements of Sen. Benjamin 
Wade). 
 157. Wesson & Pulford, supra note 152, at 152. 
 158. See generally Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289 (1981) (emphasizing that default 
becomes a plausible strategy as economic indicators worsen). 
 159. Id. But see generally Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad 
Times”?, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 352 (2007) (arguing that defaulting countries do not always 
have bad economic conditions). 
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concerned is precisely doubt about the possibility of government 
default, even though the doubt occurs before the default.160 The 
presence of a significant number of these signals, although not 
determinative, certainly strengthens an argument that the validity of 
the debt has been placed in substantial doubt. Indeed, an analysis of 
the political and economic context is appropriately considered a 
threshold inquiry. 
The analysis undertaken by credit-rating agencies sheds light on 
the kinds of economic and political factors that are important to this 
determination. Because “[s]overeign credit ratings are a condensed 
assessment of a government’s ability and willingness to repay its 
public debt on time,” these ratings are extremely important in 
analyses of sovereign-default probabilities.161 The credit-rating agency 
Standard & Poor’s relies on five different factors when rating 
sovereign debt: (1) “[i]nstitutional effectiveness and political risks,” 
(2) “[e]conomic structure and growth prospects,” (3) “[e]xternal 
liquidity and international investment position,” (4) “[f]iscal 
performance and flexibility,” and (5) “[m]onetary flexibility.”162 These 
factors can be distilled into several main lines of inquiry, focusing on: 
the political climate, including institutional design; the domestic 
economic climate; and the domestic economy’s relation to the 
international economy. 
Like credit-rating agencies, economists also rely on institutional 
effectiveness and political risk to predict default.163 Economists 
 
 160. The kind of doubt that the Public Debt Clause is concerned with is doubt about 
whether the government will continue to meet its obligations. This is the kind of doubt that 
Senator Wade spoke about in his description of the Public Debt Clause. See CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade) (“[My amendment] puts 
the debt incurred in the civil war on our [the Union’s] part under the guardianship of the 
Constitution of the United States, so that a Congress cannot repudiate it. I believe that to do 
this will give great confidence to capitalists and will be of incalculable pecuniary benefit to the 
United States . . . .”). Professor Jack Balkin outlined a similar kind of uncertainty in his analysis 
of the Public Debt Clause’s legislative history. See Balkin, supra note 132 (“What do we learn 
from this history? If Wade’s speech offers the central rationale for Section Four, the goal was to 
remove threats of default on federal debts from partisan struggle.”). 
 161. António Afonso, Pedro Gomes & Philipp Rother, Short- and Long-Run Determinants 
of Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings, 16 INT’L J. FIN. & ECON. 1, 1 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 162. STANDARD & POOR’S, SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT RATING METHODOLOGY AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/
?articleType=PDF&assetID=1245310252210. 
 163. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez, The Politics of Sovereign Defaults, 96 
FED. RES. BANK RICH. ECON. Q. 291, 308 (2010). See generally Jennifer M. Oetzel, Richard A. 
Bettis & Marc Zenner, Country Risk Measures: How Risky Are They?, 36 J. WORLD BUS. 128 
(2001) (discussing the use of the political-risk measure in analyzing country risk). 
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characterize political risk as “the risk that arises from the potential 
actions of governments and other influential domestic forces, which 
threaten expected returns on investment.”164 Thus, when there is 
contentious political infighting, or an indication that the machinery of 
government is grinding to a halt, political risk is high.165 For instance, 
the United States’ political risk would seem to be higher under a 
divided government than under a united government.166 It would also 
be higher when procedural impediments and political posturing, 
caused by, for instance, intense interest group pressure, make 
compromise difficult.167 Sustained and persistent gridlock can, 
likewise, create higher political risk.168 
The other types of default predictors used by economists concern 
factors within the domestic economy and in the international context: 
domestic economic performance and the country’s terms of trade and 
borrowing costs.169 On the domestic front, countries that are about to 
default have higher debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios.170 
Importantly, however, “what matters is whether a country’s debt to 
GDP [ratio] is high relative to its own mean, not whether it is high 
relative to other countries.”171 If a country has a greater-than-typical 
debt-to-GDP ratio, it is more likely that the country will default than 
under alternative circumstances. On the international front, countries 
 
 164. Christopher M. Bilson, Timothy J. Brailsford & Vincent C. Hooper, The Explanatory 
Power of Political Risk in Emerging Markets, 11 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2002). 
 165. See Afonso et al., supra note 161, at 2 (“Indicators of how the government conducts its 
fiscal policy, in particular budget balance and government debt, can also be relevant, as well as 
variables that assess political risk, such as corruption or social indexes.”). 
 166. See Gabriel Cuadra & Horacio Sapriza, Sovereign Default, Interest Rates and Political 
Uncertainty in Emerging Markets, 76 J. INT’L ECON. 78, 88 (2008) (stating that “[c]ountries that 
are subject to larger political uncertainty and stronger domestic disagreement” are seen as more 
likely to default). 
 167. See, e.g., id. (“A body of empirical literature points out that high turnover rates/length 
of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affect sovereign debt, 
country spreads and default rates.”). 
 168. See id. at 79 (discussing how a higher “degree of polarization or disagreement among 
different domestic groups” can increase the likelihood of default). 
 169. See, e.g., Hatchondo & Martinez, supra note 163, at 300 (summarizing literature that 
establishes various relationships between political stability, macroeconomic conditions, 
borrowing costs, and default risks). 
 170. Jens Hilscher & Yves Nosbusch, Determinants of Sovereign Risk 14 (Nov. 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 171. Id. at 21. 
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susceptible to default have higher volatility of terms of trade and 
higher borrowing costs.172 
The preceding measures of economic uncertainty can be usefully 
employed in the first component of the substantial doubt test. This is 
not, of course, to say that a technical economic analysis needs to be 
undertaken when analyzing the Public Debt Clause. It is only to say 
that a questioning of the debt is more likely to happen, perhaps only 
likely to happen, under conditions of economic and political 
uncertainty. When those conditions are present, certain governmental 
actions that may be permissible at other times are more likely to 
cause substantial doubt and therefore violate the Public Debt Clause. 
In assessing whether government actions are unconstitutional, then, a 
decisionmaker, such as the president, must broadly assess the 
economic and political context in which those actions take place. 
Importantly, either a sufficiently poor economic condition or a 
sufficiently negative political environment could at times provide the 
right conditions for substantial doubt. When both occur 
simultaneously, the likelihood that subjective apprehension will occur 
is much greater. 
The second component of the substantial doubt test focuses on 
context-specific indications of debtholder apprehension.173 This 
inquiry is integral to the accuracy of overall determinations about the 
constitutionality of government actions,174 but, because of its 
subjective nature, requires the use of reliable proxies for debtholder 
uncertainty. One proxy is “whether any rating service ha[s] 
downgraded the debt.”175 Also relevant is whether any of the credit-
rating agencies have issued a warning about the debt.176 Certainly the 
right political and economic preconditions are relevant, and perhaps 
necessary, but they will likely never be sufficient. What really matters 
is whether debt holders question the validity of the debt. By looking 
 
 172. Jens Hilscher & Yves Nosbusch, Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic 
Fundamentals and the Pricing of Sovereign Debt, 14 REV. FIN. 235, 258 (2010). 
 173. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 569 (“[C]ourt[s] would need to address whether a 
questioned congressional action ‘could place its ability to honor such debts in doubt.’ In the 
1990s, it is possible that no government action would place the government’s ability to honor 
debts in doubt because the government’s credit rating is so high, but the courts would need to 
develop tests to identify when the government lost this ability.”). 
 174. See generally Lars Peter Hansen, Beliefs, Doubts and Learning: Valuing 
Macroeconomic Risk, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2007) (explaining the importance of identifying 
subjective uncertainty and doubt in undertaking economic analysis). 
 175. Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 569. 
 176. See id. at 570 n.33 (highlighting the issuance of debt warnings as an objective standard). 
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to these proxies, a decisionmaker can tell whether the market 
envisions the government’s action to be such a substantial variation 
from prior practice that there is a credible possibility that the 
government will fail to meet its obligations. Absent an actual 
downgrade or a warning from a rating agency, other indicators can be 
relevant to debt holders’ states of mind, such as press commentary, 
historical indices, statistical studies, reactions of world markets, 
interest rates, and anything else that offers evidence of debt holders’ 
subjective doubts about the validity of the public debt.177 
Therefore, in weighing whether some action generates 
substantial doubt, a decisionmaker would need to ask a number of 
questions under the two-pronged substantial doubt test. First, do the 
economic and political indicators suggest that the atmosphere is ripe 
for default? Second, has a rating agency issued a warning or 
downgraded the nation’s credit rating, or are there other indications 
that debt holders substantially doubt whether the government will 
meet its obligations? These factors are no more abstruse or difficult 
to apply than determining, for instance, whether the government has 
a sufficiently “compelling interest” to take some action.178 In the same 
way that it would be difficult to apply the strict scrutiny test in the 
abstract, however, a fuller analysis of the merits of the substantial 
doubt test can be seen in its application to scenarios of potential 
questioning surrounding the increased hostility during in debt-limit 
debates. 
IV. VIOLATIONS OF THE PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE: APPLYING THE 
SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT TEST 
The substantial doubt test determines how close to the edge of 
default congressional obstructionism must be for the conduct to be 
unconstitutional.179 There is no bright line or dollar amount 
commanded by the substantial doubt test, so historical scenarios best 
illustrate the implementation of the test. To show how the substantial 
doubt test can be applied, this Part first analyzes the 1995–96 and 
 
 177. See id. (“The subjective standard . . . could be assessed using a multi-factorial test, in 
which a judicial fact-finder might consider bond ratings, stock and bond prices, statistical 
studies, newspaper commentary, and testimony by debt-holders.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932–37 (1988) (discussing 
the difficulty of deciding what state interests qualify as “compelling”). 
 179. See supra Part III. 
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2011 debt-limit debates and concludes that Congress’s actions 
violated the Public Debt Clause by creating substantial doubt about 
the validity of the debt. Next, it examines the 2002 debt-limit debate 
and shows how even contentious political infighting can be 
constitutionally permissible under the Public Debt Clause. 
Because most debt debates will not involve an unconstitutional 
creation of substantial doubt, the 2002 debate is representative of 
these contentious yet constitutionally acceptable debates. And, for 
just that reason, this Part also singles out the results of two debates to 
illustrate the variety of unconstitutional conduct. This Part analyzes 
the two unconstitutional episodes side-by-side both to show the 
similarities between types of unconstitutional doubt creation and to 
more easily contrast the context of these debates with the factors 
characteristic of actions taken during constitutionally permissible 
policy disputes. 
A. Unconstitutional Obstructionism: The 1995–96 Showdown 
One of the most memorable debt-limit clashes was President 
Clinton’s 1995–96 showdown with a hostile Congress.180 Unafraid to 
“waive the Gephardt Rule[, which was] designed to provide political 
cover on debt limit votes,” congressional Republicans confronted the 
administration’s request for an increase in the debt limit head-on.181 
The extended debate—which lasted almost six months182—was 
precipitated by the rise of the Newt Gingrich-led Republican House 
majority and its staunch fiscal conservatism.183 When analysts 
determined that the Treasury would reach the statutory limit by the 
end of October 1995, Republicans in Congress were adamant about 
refusing to increase the limit without serious concessions from the 
president.184 The administration, on the other hand, was not willing to 
 
 180. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 156 (“[I]n 1995, the Gingrich-led 104th Congress 
openly and brazenly sought to use legislation increasing the debt ceiling to force President 
Clinton to accept sweeping reforms, including a seven-year plan to balance the budget . . . .”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-130, DEBT CEILING: ANALYSIS OF 
ACTIONS DURING THE 1995–1996 CRISIS 19 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1996/ai96130.pdf. 
 183. See Patrice Hill, Default on National Debt Payment Looms with Gingrich Budget 
Threat, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at A8 (“House Speaker Newt Gingrich, with backing from 
freshman Republicans and GOP deficit hawks intent on balancing the budget, has said he will 
not allow Congress to pass an increase in the Treasury’s debt limit unless President Clinton 
signs a budget that will balance by 2002.”). 
 184. See supra note 183. 
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accept the massive spending reductions and the requirement of a 
balanced budget that Republicans were demanding.185 After two 
separate government shutdowns in late 1995 and early 1996,186 the 
debt-limit crisis “was resolved on March 29, 1996, when Congress 
raised the debt ceiling to $5.5 trillion.”187 
Applying the substantial doubt test, this Section argues that the 
shutdown-producing congressional actions during the 1995–96 
debates were unconstitutional under the Public Debt Clause. First, 
the political climate was extremely divisive. In the 1994 election, 
“[t]he Republican Party won a majority of the votes cast for Congress 
for the first time since 1946.”188 After the election, Republicans 
controlled both houses of Congress and faced a hostile chief executive 
in President Clinton.189 The two branches were set to collide over 
disagreements on the debt, with “Gingrich and his budget-cutting 
revolutionaries steaming in from one direction, [and] Clinton and his 
veto rolling in from the other.”190 Although the political context 
portended interminable conflict, the economy was in good shape—
and its prospects were brightening as “the high-tech-driven economic 
boom of the late 1990s”191 promised to bring further financial 
prosperity. Even though the economic outlook was positive, this 
intense political conflict was sufficiently acrimonious to open the door 
for substantial doubt from debt holders. And the subjective indicators 
of debt-holder apprehension demonstrate that this was precisely their 
reaction. 
The second factor in the substantial doubt test, the debt-holder-
subjectivity element, indicates that the 1995–96 debate created 
substantial doubt about the debt’s validity. During the closing months 
of 1995, “Republicans freely dispensed threats to shut down the 
 
 185. See David E. Sanger, G.O.P. Gives Dual Message on Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
1995, at A22 (“Mr. Clinton has vowed to veto that budget . . . .”). 
 186. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The 
Anatomy of the 1995–96 Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 607–09 (1998) 
(recounting the government shutdowns). 
 187. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 182, at 19. 
 188. Curtis Gans, 1994 Congressional Elections: An Analysis, FAIRVOTE, http://
archive.fairvote.org/reports/1995/chp3/gans.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Krishnakumar, supra note 186, at 589 (quoting DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL 
WEISSKOPF, “TELL NEWT TO SHUT UP!” 149 (1996)). 
 191. YARROW, supra note 20, at 46. 
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government and throw it into default.”192 These threats were taken 
seriously enough for the public in general, and debt holders in 
particular, to be worried about default.193 In fact, because the credit-
rating agency was “[a]larmed that the budget negotiations in 
Washington might lead to an unprecedented default on the $4.9 
trillion national debt, Moody’s issued an unusually severe warning to 
the U.S. government.”194 Additionally, Standard & Poor’s “warned 
that ‘the global capital market’s unquestioned faith in the United 
States government’s willingness to honor its financial obligations has, 
to some degree, been diminished by the failure of the government to 
act in a timely fashion.’”195 These warnings by top credit-rating 
agencies indicated the degree to which debt holders feared that the 
government might miss payments on its obligations. There was a 
general awareness that the divisiveness created by the stalemate was 
qualitatively different from other debates and that congressional 
wielding of this potent “weapon” might harm future economic 
interests of the debt holders.196 
Added to these downgrade warnings was a noticeable market 
reaction to the debt-limit gridlock. After an extensive analysis of 
bond prices throughout the crisis, economists Srinivas Nippani, Pu 
Liu, and Craig T. Schulman concluded that “a potential Treasury 
default occurred in 1995–1996 when the U.S. President and Congress 
disagreed on passing a balanced budget bill.”197 Their conclusion was 
based on the fact that the market charged a “default premium” on 
Treasury securities during the period in which the conflict was 
occurring.198 These default premiums are only charged when there is 
 
 192. Budget Showdown Looms; U.S. Borrowing Authority Extended Until March 29, RICH. 
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1996, at A8. 
 193. See Hill, supra note 183 (recording the fear and potential effects of default and stating 
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TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A1 (discussing the contentious months of debate about raising the debt 
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 197. Srinivas Nippani, Pu Liu & Craig T. Schulman, Are Treasury Securities Free of 
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enough evidence for the market to reasonably infer that there is a 
credible possibility of default.199 The market thus envisioned the 1995–
96 debate as sufficiently hostile to produce substantial doubt about 
the validity of the U.S. debt. 
The bitterly divided political environment, coupled with ample 
indications of substantial doubt among debt holders, leads to the 
conclusion that the 1995–96 debate caused an unconstitutional 
questioning of the public debt. As Professor Anita Krishnakumar has 
noted, “This extraordinary breakdown in budget-making, while 
unprecedented in scope and degree, was not the first, nor is it likely to 
be the last ‘train wreck’ of its kind.”200 Indeed, this Note argues that 
the unconstitutional 1995–96 “train wreck” was paralleled—and in 
fact surpassed—by the 2011 debt debate. 
B. Unconstitutional Brinkmanship: The 2011 Debt-Limit Debate 
The 2011 debt-limit debate began in January 2011 after Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid requesting an increase in the debt limit.201 This letter 
expressed Geithner’s belief that the debt would reach the limit at 
some time between March 31 and May 16, 2011,202 though his later, 
final estimate indicated that August 2 was the absolute latest date 
that the limit could be reached.203 Until this date, the Treasury entered 
a debt-issuance suspension period and engaged in a number of 
extraordinary measures204—similar to those undertaken in years 
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 201. Letter from Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, to Harry Reid, Majority 
Leader, U.S. Senate 1 (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/
Documents/Letter.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-701, DEBT 
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BORROWING COSTS 9 tbl.2 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592832.pdf (listing 
Geithner’s letter as the first event in the debt-crisis chronology). 
 202. Letter from Timothy Geithner to Harry Reid, supra note 201, at 1. 
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 204. During a debt-issuance suspension period, defined as “any period for which the 
Secretary of the Treasury determines for purposes of this subsection that the issuance of 
obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit,” 5 
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past—to keep the debt below the statutory limit.205 With the 
government on the brink of default, the House and Senate passed a 
compromise measure that was signed into law on August 2, 2011,206 
the very day that the Treasury estimated it would be unable to 
continue meeting its fiscal obligations.207 
Though this debt debate shared many facial similarities with 
previous, routine debates, application of the substantial doubt test 
suggests that it was different for a number of reasons. First, the 
macroeconomic indicators signified a substantially weaker climate 
than in prior years. The public debt was an estimated 94.3 percent of 
GDP at the end of the 2010 fiscal year and would eventually reach 99 
percent of GDP by September 30, 2011, the end of the 2011 fiscal 
year.208 To provide context, before the end of the 2009 fiscal year, the 
public debt had not even reached 70 percent of GDP for the preceding 
fifty-five years.209 Furthermore, in 2011 the U.S. economy had seen 
one of the largest GDP shrinkages in decades—negative economic 
growth of 2.6 percent in 2009 due to a recession from which the 
country was still recovering.210 Total GDP shrinkage stood at “4.1%, 
marking the deepest recession since 1947.”211 
These macroeconomic indicators were not the only harbingers of 
substantial doubt. The U.S. political situation was also deeply divided 
following the 2010 midterm elections. Republicans controlled the 
House of Representatives, while Democrats held the Senate and the 
presidency.212 The rising “Tea Party” movement sought to introduce 
intense fiscal conservatism into debt-limit debates.213 Many of these 
 
Congress as soon as possible regarding fund balances and any extraordinary actions taken.”); 5 
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 209. Id. at 133–34 tbl.7.1. 
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contentBody (last visited Feb. 19, 2013). 
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More Educated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at A1 (remarking that most Tea Party members 
desired a smaller government above all else). 
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newly elected Tea Party Republicans took a hard line during debates 
on the debt limit.214 Even more alarming, in early June, some 
Republicans were starting to call for a “technical default”215 as the 
price to pay for compromise.216 
Layered on top of these poor macroeconomic and political 
factors, “[a] surprise warning about U.S. debt by credit-rating agency 
Standard & Poor’s [on April 18] sent stocks plunging . . . and 
crystallized the threat that mounting federal budget deficits and 
national debt pose to the U.S. financial system and the American way 
of life.”217 In its warning about U.S. debt, Standard & Poor’s indicated 
its shock that “more than two years after the beginning of the recent 
crisis, U.S. policymakers have still not agreed on a strategy to reverse 
recent fiscal deterioration or address longer-term fiscal pressures.”218 
On July 13, 2011, Moody’s Investor Services, another major credit-
rating agency, also warned the U.S. that its debt could be subject to 
downgrade if systemic changes were not made.219 And Fitch Ratings, 
the third major credit-rating agency, followed suit with a similar 
warning on July 17.220 
The degree of intractable political debate, fear among debt 
holders, and overall depressed economic conditions caused credit-
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 217. Kevin G. Hall, Why S&P’s Warning on U.S. Debt Matters, MCCLATCHY (Apr. 
 18, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/18/112369/why-sps-warning-on-us-debt-matters 
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rating agency Standard & Poor’s to downgrade the U.S. debt for the 
first time in history—and this occurred even after a compromise had 
been reached.221 The agency said that it downgraded U.S. debt 
“because [it] believe[d] that the prolonged controversy over raising 
the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate 
that further near-term progress . . . is less likely than we previously 
assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process.”222 
These same factors—a bitterly divided political environment, 
coupled with the numerous indications of substantial uncertainty 
among debt holders in an overall abysmal financial atmosphere—
indicate that Congress’s actions during the 2011 debt-limit debate 
created substantial doubt about the validity of the public debt. Under 
the first prong of the substantial doubt test, the economic and 
political contexts sufficiently elevated the possibility of default. And 
under the second prong, as illustrated by the reaction of the rating 
agencies, debt holders suffered great doubt about the validity of the 
national debt. Congressional actions—including posturing, rhetoric, 
and a failure to more expeditiously resolve the debt-limit impasse—
during the 2011 debate were, in other words, unconstitutional under 
the Public Debt Clause. But this kind of unconstitutional conduct, 
though certainly a cause for concern, is not the norm for debt-limit 
increases. 
C. A Constitutional Policy Dispute: The 2002 Debt-Limit Debate 
In late 2001, toward the end of President George W. Bush’s first 
year in office, the national debt was approaching the statutory limit.223 
This was in spite of the four years of budget surpluses from fiscal year 
1998 through fiscal year 2001.224 Though the debt was within a mere 
$25 million of the limit at the beginning of 2002, the Treasury used 
technical accounting measures to keep the debt below the limit until 
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the April 15 tax revenues came in.225 By mid-May 2002, however, the 
debt had climbed back to within $15 million of the debt limit.226 The 
Treasury was again forced to use extraordinary measures to keep the 
debt below the limit, and it estimated that the government could not 
meet its obligations—without an increase—after June 28, 2002.227 The 
Senate then passed legislation increasing the debt limit on June 11 
without any debate.228 The House, on the brink of default, passed the 
debt limit increase by a single vote on June 27.229 The legislation was 
signed into law on June 28, the day the Treasury had estimated that 
the government would be unable to meet its obligations.230 
Though the national debt was extremely close to the debt limit, it 
does not appear that any of Congress’s actions put the debt into 
substantial doubt. First, under the substantial doubt test, 
macroeconomic factors indicated that the nation’s economy was not 
conducive to default. For example, debt as a percentage of GDP was 
only 56.4 percent on September 30, 2001, and 58.8 percent on 
September 30, 2002.231 Comparatively, this ratio was similar to what it 
had been for the previous decade; indeed, it was slightly lower.232 
Second, economic growth, as measured by annual GDP percentage 
increase, was approximately 2.45 percent from 2001 to 2002—an 
increase within the normal range of GDP increases.233 The 
macroeconomic indicators therefore did not give cause for concern. 
Similarly, the political environment was not conducive to default. 
As a result of the 2000 elections, the Republicans had control of the 
House of Representatives and possessed the tie-breaking vote in the 
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Senate, which, after the election, was split 50–50.234 They also, of 
course, controlled the presidency.235 Under a united government, the 
odds of default are certainly less than otherwise.236 
Finally, other subjective indications were likewise not 
emblematic of debt-holder concern. No major credit-rating agency 
issued a warning or downgraded the nation’s credit rating, and all 
signs indicated that “[n]o one believed a federal default would 
actually occur.”237 Indeed, the debate itself was more a political 
calculation on the part of Democrats to extract extraneous favors by 
withholding votes rather than a principled stand against increased 
government indebtedness of the kind that creates debtholder 
uncertainty.238 
These factors indicate that the 2002 debt-limit debate, though 
fierce, did not generate substantial doubt about the validity of the 
public debt and was, therefore, not unconstitutional. Congress did not 
violate the Public Debt Clause even though it waited until the last 
minute to raise the debt limit. The macroeconomic indicators 
suggested a sufficiently strong economy, the political division was not 
partisan enough to create the conditions for a plausible default, and 
the subjective factors showed that debt holders did not realistically 
fear a government default. That the vote was so close and Congress 
waited until the last minute to raise the limit—and yet no one 
questioned the debt—shows the futility of trying to make a bright-line 
test for violations of the Public Debt Clause. In 2002, the debt was 
within $15 million dollars of the ceiling—an amount that “equaled 
about five minutes of federal outlays.”239 Yet because no substantial 
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doubt was created concerning government payment, there was no 
constitutional violation. 
The substantial doubt test—at least no more than any other 
constitutional test—is not an arbitrary test that can be manipulated 
based on the policy preferences of the decisionmaker. It can be 
applied in a principled way by analyzing observable and objective 
data surrounding debt-limit debates and by determining whether debt 
holders have experienced substantial doubt about the continuing 
validity of the obligations that are owed to them. When this 
substantial doubt occurs, the Public Debt Clause has been violated. 
CONCLUSION 
With the national debt spiraling out of control240 and the 
economic recovery stagnant,241 greater hostility and contention will 
likely accompany future debt-limit increases.242 The combination of 
unavoidable increases243—caused by deepening budget deficits244—and 
consolidated opposition—caused by the revitalization of intense fiscal 
conservatism245—makes the Public Debt Clause more relevant today 
than ever before. 
Every indication suggests that the increasing vehemence 
surrounding debt-limit legislation will continue indefinitely.246 Some 
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of these debates will be contentious, even hostile, but still 
constitutional.247 Others, those that create substantial doubt about the 
validity of the debt, will be unconstitutional.248 Directed by well-
defined constitutional guideposts, the president should disregard the 
debt limit when congressional obstructionism rises to the level of 
creating substantial doubt about the continuing validity of the public 
debt. 
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